AI Summary

• The U.S. shift to deprioritize Russian cyber threats in favor of focusing on China creates dangerous blind spots in national defense
• Cyber threats operate simultaneously, not sequentially - threat actors don’t pause operations based on U.S. policy priorities
• Historical precedent shows that underestimating or ignoring active adversaries leads to successful attacks on critical infrastructure
• Effective cybersecurity requires comprehensive, multi-threat defense strategies rather than reactive focus shifts

We Just Stopped Watching Russia and That’s Terrifying

So the U.S. has apparently decided Russia isn’t worth worrying about anymore from a cybersecurity standpoint. The new plan focuses on China as the primary cyber adversary, which means Russian threat actors just got bumped way down the priority list.

That’s like ignoring one burglar because you noticed another one casing your neighbor’s house.

Anyone who’s spent serious time tracking threat actors knows this approach is backwards. Cyber warfare doesn’t work like a neat corporate org chart where everyone takes turns. Multiple bad actors hit the same targets from different angles, often at the same time.

The Backwards Logic

Here’s what we’re supposed to buy: China has become the bigger, badder cyber threat with their fancy persistent threat groups and massive IP theft operations. So naturally, we should pivot all our attention there while Russian activities slide to the back burner.

Sure, China’s cyber game has gotten scary good. Groups like APT1 and APT40 are pulling off some seriously sophisticated espionage campaigns. The 2021 Microsoft Exchange Server attacks showed they can operate at absolutely massive scale.

But here’s the thing - cyber adversaries don’t give a damn about our policy priorities. They hit targets when they see openings, not when it’s convenient for our strategic planning sessions.

Russia’s Greatest Hits

Let me refresh everyone’s memory on what Russia’s been up to lately:

The SolarWinds hack took down about 18,000 organizations, including a bunch of federal agencies. This wasn’t some quick smash-and-grab job - it was methodical, patient, and devastatingly effective.

NotPetya in 2017 racked up over $10 billion in damage worldwide. Started as targeted hits on Ukrainian infrastructure, then spread like wildfire to shipping companies, hospitals, you name it.

The Colonial Pipeline attack shut down critical energy infrastructure for days. Gas shortages up and down the East Coast because ransomware took out a pipeline.

These weren’t lucky shots or amateur hour stuff. Each one showed careful planning, smart target selection, and a clear understanding of how to maximize damage.

And guess what? None of this magically stopped when we decided China was more important.

How Threat Actors Actually Work

After tracking these groups for years, some patterns become pretty obvious:

They Don’t Take Breaks: Russian cybercriminal groups and state teams keep their infrastructure running 24/7, regardless of what Washington decides to focus on this week. Cozy Bear and Fancy Bear didn’t pack up and go home when the policy focus shifted.

They Hit When They Can: Bad actors exploit vulnerabilities the moment they find them. They’re not checking our threat assessment reports before launching attacks.

They Overlap: Different threat groups often target the same organizations within months of each other. I’ve seen cases where Chinese espionage groups and Russian ransomware teams both hit the same network in the same quarter.

What Goes Wrong When We Stop Paying Attention

Deprioritizing active threats creates some very predictable problems:

We Miss Stuff: Fewer resources tracking Russian movements means bigger intelligence gaps. Harder to figure out who did what and how to respond.

Deterrence Breaks Down: Consistent attention keeps bad actors cautious. When they think we’re not watching, they get bolder.

Coordination Gets Easier: Russia and China don’t need to be best friends to both benefit from hitting U.S. infrastructure while we’re distracted elsewhere.

The dumbest thing you can assume in cybersecurity is that threats will politely wait their turn.

Infrastructure Doesn’t Care About Policy Priorities

Power grids, water systems, financial networks - they’re all just as vulnerable to Russian attacks as Chinese ones.

Picture this: Russian groups go after energy infrastructure while Chinese ops target telecom. Both succeed because we concentrated defenses on just one threat. The combined impact is way worse than either attack alone.

This isn’t some far-fetched scenario. We’ve seen coordinated timing before, where multiple threat actors exploit the same vulnerability windows or run similar social engineering campaigns.

What Real Defense Looks Like

Actual cybersecurity works on a simple principle: all active threats get the attention they deserve.

Watch Everything: Threat intelligence needs to cover all active adversaries, not just this month’s priority. Keep tracking Russian operations while expanding Chinese monitoring.

Build for Multiple Attacks: Infrastructure defense should assume you’re getting hit from multiple directions simultaneously. That means redundant monitoring and response capabilities that can handle several incidents at once.

Coordinate Internationally: Different allies worry about different threats based on their geography and economics. Share intelligence so everyone’s covered even when individual countries focus on specific adversaries.

The Same Mistake, Over and Over

Every major cybersecurity screwup follows the same playbook: underestimate active threats while looking somewhere else.

The 2014 Sony Pictures attack worked partly because everyone underestimated North Korean cyber capabilities. The 2015 Ukrainian power grid attacks caught people off guard even though Russian capabilities were well-documented.

Same pattern every time: known threat actors, documented capabilities, but attention focused elsewhere when the attack happened.

The Actual Solution

Don’t pick between China and Russia as cyber priorities. Build defense capabilities that handle both at the same time.

That means accepting that cybersecurity works in a multi-threat world where bad actors don’t coordinate with our policy calendars. It means investing in comprehensive monitoring, resilient infrastructure, and response capabilities that scale across different types of incidents.

The internet doesn’t recognize our org charts or budget meetings. Cyber threats run continuously, simultaneously, and often work together whether they plan to or not.

Treating national cybersecurity like we can only handle one major problem at a time is dangerously naive.

Both China and Russia are active, sophisticated threats to U.S. infrastructure and national security. Both deserve serious attention, sustained intelligence work, and robust defenses.

Getting this balance wrong doesn’t just mean policy embarrassment. It means successful attacks on critical systems that millions of Americans use every single day.